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This paper provides four axioms that uniquely characterize the Sequential
Raiffa solution proposed by Raiffa (1951, 1953) for two-person bargaining
games. Three of these axioms are standard and are shared by several pop-
ular bargaining solutions. They suffice to characterize these solutions on
TU-bargaining games where they coincide. The fourth axiom is a weak-
ening of Kalai’s (1977) axiom of step-by-step negotiating and turns out to
be sort of a dual condition to a weaker version of Nash’s IIA-axiom that
together with the three standard axioms suffices to characterize the Nash
bargaining solution due to Nash (1950). A conclusion of this axiomatization
is that in contrast to all other known bargaining solutions the Sequential
Raiffa solution does not represent just another kind of fairness or equity
condition in addition to the three standard axioms but rather is determined
by indefinite repeated application of the three standard axioms.
Key words: Bargaining games, Raiffa solution, Nash solution,
axiomatization
1This article is an extended version of Trockel (2001). While finishing it I became aware
of a recent working paper by Anbarei and Sun (2009) dealing with robustness of inter-
mediate agreements in bargaining. They also provide an, however quite different, set of
axioms that determine the Sequential Raiffa solution.
1
1 INTRODUCTION
The first bargaining solution had been introduced by Nash (1950, 1953) who
provided a procedural definition (“maximize the (Nash) product of players’
utility levels”) and an axiomatic characterization.
Almost simultaneously Raiffa (1951) offered an analysis of bargaining solu-
tions under the name of “arbitration schemes” a shortened version of which
was published in Raiffa (1953). In this work Raiffa discussed essentially
four bargaining solutions 2, in today’s terminology the Nash solution, the
Kalai-Rosenthal solution, the Continuous Raiffa solution and the Sequential
(or Discrete) Raiffa solution. The Kalai-Rosenthal solution, however, coin-
cides in the figure on page 380 of Raiffa (1953) with the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution. This is due to identical utopia points of the analyzed bargaining
problem and its individually rational sub-problem.
Of all these and other frequently used bargaining solutions only the Sequen-
tial Raiffa solution had resisted up to now an axiomatic characterization.
The various axiomatizations of bargaining solutions in the literature differ in
underlying domains and do not always provide the largest possible domain.
Also in my present analysis I shall not try to provide the largest possible
domain for my axiomatization of the Sequential Raiffa solution. I will rather
focus on providing an axiomatization on a class of bargaining games that
allows a comparison with axiomatizations of other bargaining solutions.
I will provide an axiom that amounts to the requirement of repeated ap-
plication of the three standard axioms for bargaining solutions that suf-
fice to uniquely determine a solution on the class of hyperplane (hence on
TU) bargaining games. Those three standard axioms are shared by sev-
eral prominent bargaining solutions like the Nash, Kalai-Smorodinsky and
Perles-Maschler solutions that, however, differ on general non-hyperplane
bargaining problems where each of them is characterized by a different
fourth axiom. It is my aim in this work to provide such a fourth axiom
for the sequential Raiffa solution.
2I am very grateful to Hans Peters who via personal communication (Peters (2000)) had
helped me to clarify some confusion concerning the Raiffa solution.
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I shall derive my axiom RAS as a static restatement of Raiffa’s procedural
rules and will relate it to the step by step negotiation axiom of Kalai (1977).
The axiom RAS and a weaker version of Nash’s IIA axiom will turn out to
be somehow “dual” weakenings of Kalai’s axiom. An exact non-cooperative
foundation of the Sequential Raiffa solution (based on an approximate one
due to Myerson (1991)) is provided in Trockel (2009).
2 THE SEQUENTIAL RAIFFA SOLUTION
Before laying down the model for the formal analysis of the Sequential (or
Discrete) Raiffa solution I introduce and illustrate it graphically. Up to
different notation I follow essentially the presentation of Luce and Raiffa
(1957, pp. 136, 137).
Also Shubik (1984, pp. 196-198) refers to the Raiffa solution. However, in
his section on the Kalai-Smorodinsky which he first describes by axioms he
claims (p. 196) that “This scheme is essentially the same as that suggested
by Raiffa (1953)...” and he continues by illustrating this solution by an
example where he indeed uses the procedure of the Discrete Raiffa solution.
In fact, not only are those two solutions different, they also yield different
solution points if applied to Shubik’s example. Shubik may have fallen vic-
tim to Raiffa’s (1953) opaque presentation of four different solutions among
them the Discrete Raiffa and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions.
Also Myerson (1991), p. 395) calls the Sequential Raiffa solution “closely
related to the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution”. However, this judgement ap-
pears questionable as it is neither based on a metric on bargaining solutions
nor on any (even if only intuitive) comparison of the underlying axioms.
The latter one would in fact require an axiomatic characterization also for
the Sequential Raiffa solution!
I commented already in section 1 on the possible confusion about the Raiffa
solution. Therefore a thorough analysis of this solution providing an ax-
iomatic characterization is overdue.
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Figure 1: The Raiffa solution of (S, d)
A two-person bargaining problem as illustrated in Figure 1 consists of a
compact, convex set S ⊂ R2 of feasible payoff vectors for the two players 1
and 2 and some point d ∈ S, the disagreement point, also called threat point
or status quo point in the literature.
The interpretation of such a bargaining game is as follows:
If the players agree on some vector x ∈ S they receive the payoffs x1 and
x2, respectively. If they do not agree on any vector x ∈ S they receive d1
and d2, respectively.
Notice, that in Figure 1 the individually rational part of S, i.e.
Sd := S ∩ ({d}+ R
2
+)
is comprehensive in the sense that for any x ∈ Sd also the line segment
[d, x] := co{x, d} ⊂ Sd. This (Sd, d) is itself a bargaining problem.
The Pareto frontier of Sd, denoted ∂Sd, is the graph of the two functions
hi : [di,∞)∩ projiSd −→ [d3−i,∞)∩ proj3−iSd : xi −→ max{x3−i | x ∈ Sd},
i = 1, 2.
The Raiffa procedure determines in a first step the midpoint of the line
segment [(d1, h2(d1), (h1(d2), d2)].
In the second step the new bargaining problem (S, d1) is considered. If
d1 ∈ ∂Sd we are finished and d
1 is the vector of payoffs. Otherwise, as
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in Figure 1, the midpoint d2 of the line segment [(d11, h2(d
1
1), (h1(d
1
2), d
1
2)] is
chosen, leading to the new bargaining problem (S, d2).
Generally, dn+1 is the midpoint of the line segment [(dn1 , h2(d
n
1), (h1(d
n
2 ), d
n
2)].
For any bargaining problem (S, d) the sequence of midpoints (dn)n∈N (that
clearly depends on (S, d)) converges to some point R(S, d). If ∂S is piecewise
linear this convergence is generically finite.
The mapping R that associates with any bargaining problem (S, d) the point
R(S, d) ∈ S is called the Sequential (or Discrete) Raiffa solution.
The arbitration problem presented in Raiffa (1951, 1953) and in Luce and
Raiffa (1957) and for which the Sequential Raiffa solution has been pro-
posed is explicitly restricted to individually rational payoff vectors. More-
over, the whole procedure that leads to the Raiffa solution does not depend
on any features of (S, d) outside its individually rational part Sd. Therefore,
the Sequential Raiffa solution R automatically satisfies the axiom of Inde-
pendence of Non-Individually Rational Outcomes (INIR) of Peters (1986).
An important fact that is not explicitly stated in Kalai (1977) or Myer-
son (1977) but that has been stressed by Peters (1986) and by Peters and
van Damme (1991) is, that even individually rational solutions may de-
pend on non-individually rational parts of a bargaining problem. This
is nicely documented by the difference between the individually rational
Kalai-Smorodinsky and Kalai-Rosenthal solutions, where (only) the latter
one does not satisfy INIR.
It is the structure of the Raiffa procedure that suggests an axiomatization
of R on the domain of individually rational bargaining situations containing
the disagreement point d as a feasible payoff vector.
3 THE SETTING
The subsequent analysis does not rely on details of the theory of TU and
NTU coalitional games. Nevertheless, the bargaining games I am going to
consider may be seen as NTU games containing TU bargaining games as
special cases.
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3.1 Notation
I will use the following notation:
S ⊂ S ′ :⇐⇒ [∀x ∈ S : x ∈ S ′ and S 6= S ′]
S ⊆ S ′ :⇐⇒ S ⊂ S ′ or S = S ′
x ≥ y :⇐⇒ ∀i ∈ {1, 2} : xi ≥ yi
x > y :⇐⇒ x ≥ y and x 6= y
x >> y :⇐⇒ ∀i ∈ {1, 2} : xi > yi
R
2
+ := {x ∈ R
2 | x ≥ 0}, R2++ := {x ∈ R
2 | x >> 0}
proji : R
2 −→ R : x = (x1, x2) 7→ xi, i = 1, 2
e := (1, 1), e1 := (1, 0), e2 := (0, 1)
x · y =
∑
i xiyi inner product in R
2
x ∗ y := (x1y1, x2y2) coordinatewise multiplication in R
2
For p ∈ R2, t ∈ R:
H(p, t) := {x ∈ R2 | p · x = t} hyperplane in R2
H−(p, t) := {x ∈ R
2 | p · x ≤ t} closed lower halfspace of H(p, t)
For any hyperplane H ⊂ R2 with H ∩ R2+ 6= ∅ let S
H := H− ∩ R
2
+.
For d ∈ SH the pair (SH , d) is a hyperplane bargaining game.
coX is the convex hull of the set X ⊆ R2.
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3.2 Basic Concepts
An NTU coalitional n-person bargaining game is a mapping V that asso-
ciates with any coalition T ⊆ N = {1, ..., n} of players some feasible set of
payoff vectors V (T ) ⊂ RT := {x : T −→ R | x|NrT ≡ 0}.
If all coalitions except the grand one and the singletons become irrelevant
one has an n-person bargaining game. The simplest way to express this
irrelevance is by assuming V (T ) = {0} for all T ⊂ N with |T | > 1. Thus, 2-
person NTU games are always bargaining games. In my present framework
of N = {1, 2} I rename the set V (N) by S and denote the optimal payoffs
for i ∈ {1, 2} in V ({i}) by di.
Superadditivity reduces here to essentiality requesting that
∃ x ∈ S : x >> d, such that negotiation becomes meaningful.
If the boundary ∂Sd of the closed convex set Sd is part of a line in R
2 we
call (Sd, d) a hyperplane bargaining game.
If e = (1, 1) is a normal vector to ∂Sd the hyperplane game (Sd, d) is called
a TU bargaining game. Because of utility transfers at a rate 1/1 our TU
bargaining game can be identified with the TU game in standard notation
defined by v({i}) = di, i = 1, 2 and v(N) := maxx∈Sd e · x
DEFINITION 1:
A two person bargaining situation (or game) is a pair (S, d), where d ∈ S ⊂
R
2
+ and S is compact, convex and x /∈ ∂S.
Let B be the set of all two person bargaining games and BH the set of hyper-
plane games in B. Let B and BH0 be the subsets of B and B
H , respectively,
that have disagreement point d := 0 ∈ R2.
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DEFINITION 2:
For any set C ⊆ B a solution on C is a mapping
F : C −→ R2 : (S, d) 7→ f(S, d) ∈ S.
First, I shall formulate three axioms that are shared by axiomatic character-
izations of several popular bargaining solutions. These three axioms define
a unique bargaining solution on the domain BH of two person bargaining
games. This standard solution always picks the middle point of the line
segment ∂Sd.
Let L be any set of bargaining solutions on C ⊆ B.
Pareto Optimality (PO) : ∀(S, d) ∈ C : ({F (S, d)}+ R2+) ∩ S = {F (S, d)}
Covariance w.r.t. positive affine transformations (COV ):
∀g := ga,b : R2 −→ R2 : x 7→ a ∗ x + b (a ∈ R2++, b ∈ R) :
F (g(S), g(d)) = g(F (S, d))
Symmetry (SY M) : ∀(S, d) ∈ C :
[∀(x1, x2) ∈ S : (x2, x1) ∈ S] =⇒ F1(S, d) = F2(S, d)
Any solution that satisfies these three axioms is called a standard solution
on C.
On C = BH there exists a unique standard solution that on the set of TU
bargaining games coincides with the Shapley value.
On C = B or C = B0 there exist various different standard solutions, among
them the Nash, Kalai-Smorodinsky, Perles-Maschler and the two Raiffa so-
lutions.
For my purpose it is crucial to see that the Sequential Raiffa solution is a
standard solution. But this is obvious from the Raiffa procedure by which
it is defined.
I shall use the letter L for denoting arbitrary solutions on C ⊆ B that are
standard solutions.
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4 AXIOMATIZATION
I start by formulating four further axioms. Two of them I shall apply later
on,the other two are for comparison and interpretational purposes.
Step-by-Step Negotiaton (SSN):
Let F be a solution on B0.
∀(S ′, 0), (S, 0) ∈ B0, S ⊆ S
′ with ((S ′ − F (S, 0)) ∩ R2+, 0) ∈ B0 :
F (S ′, 0) = F (S, 0) + F ((S ′ − F (S, 0)) ∩ R2+, 0)
This axiom has been introduced by Kalai (1977) for his axiomatic charac-
terization of proportional solutions. It plays a crucial role as a reference
axiom in my present analysis.
For similar reasons I formulate now Nash’s (1951) famous IIA axiom and a
weakening of it that I call SHA.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives(IIA):
Let F be a solution on B.
∀(S ′, d), (S, d) ∈ B, S ⊆ S ′ with F (S ′, d) ∈ S : F (S ′, d) = F (S, d)
Supporting Hyperplane Approximation(SHA):
Let F be a solution on B.
∀(S, d) ∈ B, (SH , d) ∈ BH , S ⊆ SH with F (SH, d) ∈ S : F (SH, d) = F (S, d)
Notice that SH is a hyperplane game where H is a hyperplane supporting
S in the point F (SH, d).
It is closely related to the λ-transfer principle as introduced in Shapley
(1969) by which the Nash solution may be alternatively derived as Shapley’s
NTU value on bargaining games. I will not elaborate on this relation here.
But the axiom SHA may also be seen as a reference to Shapley.
It is obvious that SHA is a weakening of IIA as it is a restriction of IIA to
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those pairs ((S, d), (S ′, d)) as defined in IIA for which S ′ ∈ BH .
Now I turn from outside approximation of S to the “dual” approximation
from inside. Accordingly, I consider for a given game (S, d) ∈ B the unique
associated maximal hyperplane game (SH , d) with SH ⊆ S. The analogon to
axiom SHA in this new situation will be axiom RAS that may simultaneously
serve as a mnemonic for “Raiffa Sequential”.
Repeated Application of the Standard Axioms (RAS):
Let L be a standard solution on B.
∀(S, d) ∈ B : L(S, d) = L(SH , d) + L(S − L(SH , d), 0).
Notice, that due to COV, that is satisfied for standard solutions, one gets
L(S − L(SH , d), 0) = L(SL(SH ,d), L(S
H , d))− L(SH , d)
Hence under COV, so for any standard solution L, the axiom RAS is equiv-
alent to the following axiom:
Invariance under Change of Disagreement Points by the Raiffa Procedure (ICDR):
∀(S, d) ∈ B : L(S, d) = L(SL(SH ,d), L(S
H , d).
I can now state my first main result:
THEOREM 1:
There exists a unique standard solution R on B that satisfies RAS. This is
the Sequential Raiffa solution.
PROOF:
First I verify that R as defined by Raiffa’s procedure satisfies ICDR, hence,
as R is a standard solution, also RAS.
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For any (S, d) ∈ B the point R(S, d) is defined as the unique limit of a
sequence of points in S specified by the Raiffa procedure.
As (SL(SH ,d), L(S
H , d)) as a starting game for this procedure coincides with
the second game reached by this procedure, when (S, d) is the starting
game, both sequences finally agree and converge to the same limit, namely
{R(S, d)}. Hence
R(S, d) = R(SL(SH ,d)), L(S
H , d)).
Next, I show that there is no other standard solution L on B that satisfies
RAS.
So, let L be any standard solution on B that satisfies RAS. Denote the
games in the sequence defined by the Raiffa procedure and starting with
(S, d) by:
(S◦d◦, d
◦) := (Sd, d), (S
1
d1
, d1) := (SL(SH ,d), L(S
H , d) etc.
Because of ICDR we have
L(S, d) = L(Sndn , d
n) ∀ n ∈ N.
In particular for the Raiffa solution that is standard we have
R(S, d) = R(Sndn , d
n) ∀ n ∈ N and, moreover,
limn−→∞ R(S
n
dn , d
n) = R(Sd, d) ≡ R(S, d).
As the sequence (Sndn)n∈N converges in the Hausdorff metric to {R(S, d)} also
the sequence L(Sndn , d
n) must converge to R(S, d). But as it is a constant
sequence we get:
L(S, d) = limn−→∞ L(S
n
dn , d
n) = R(S, d)
Q.E.D.
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5 APPRAISAL OF THE AXIOM RAS
The goal of the present section is it to demonstrate that the axioms RAS
and SHA are somehow dual weakenings of Kalai’s SSN axiom. For this sake
it is convenient to consider explicitly also singleton bargaining sets. For
these the points of disagreement and of solution coincide.
For any given game (S, d) ∈ B there exist minimal hyperplane games (S¯H , d)
with S ⊆ S¯H and maximal hyperplane games (SH , d) with SH ⊆ S.
(S¯H , d) is minimal in this sense if for any other hyperplane game (S˜H , d)
the relation S¯H ⊃ S˜H ⊇ S is impossible.
Likewise (SH , d) is maximal if for any other hyperplane game (S˜H , d) the
relation SH ⊂ S˜H ⊆ S is impossible.
Any (S, d) ∈ B has a unique (SH , d) but generally many (S¯H , d). Denote
the set of those minimal games by HS.
I will apply now the axiom SSN with its general S, S ′, S ⊆ S ′ to the following
situations where L is supposed to be a standard solution:
case 1 : S ′ := S¯H , S¯H ∈ HS, L(S¯H , 0) ∈ S
case 2 : S := S ′H
In case 1 the axiom SSN reduces to:
∀(S, 0), (S¯H , 0) ∈ B0 with L(S¯
H , 0) ∈ S : L(S¯H , 0) = L(S, 0)
This is exactly the restatement of SHA for this case. Indeed, as L(S¯
H
, 0) ∈
∂S and L(S, 0) ∈ ∂S the condition ((S¯H − L(S, 0)) ∩ R2+, 0) ∈ B0 in SSN is
automatically satisfied.
The statement in SSN, namely:
L(S¯H , 0) = L(S, 0) + L((S¯H − L(S, 0)) ∩ R2+, 0)
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can equivalently written as
L(S¯H , 0)− L(S, 0) = L((S¯H − L(S, 0)) ∩ R2+, 0).
As the right hand term is non-negative, the equality requires this to be the
case also for the left hand term.
But for L(S¯H , 0) 6= L(S, 0) this term has one positive and one negative co-
ordinate. Hence we must have L(S¯H , 0) = L(S, 0). This effect is illustrated
in Figure 2.
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x2
x1
L(S¯H, 0)
L(S, 0)
S S¯H
Figure 2: L(S¯H , 0)− L(S, 0) 6≥ 0
Next I consider case 2.
This time the smaller S in axiom SSN equals SH ⊂ S ′ where (SH , 0) ∈ BH0 .
Therefore, the condition ((S ′ − L(SH , 0)) ∩ R2+, 0) ∈ B0 is automatically
satisfied.
Thus, for d = 0 axiom SSN reduces in case 2 exactly to RAS.
The duality of inner and outer hyperplane approximation as represented
by RAS and SHA is visualized by Figure 3 that is based on the following
equivalent reformulations of axioms ICDR (hence RAS) and SHA.
RAS*: Let L(SH , d) ∈ S. ∀(S, d) ∈ B : L(S) = L(SL(SH ,d), L(S
H , d))
SHA*: Let L(S¯H , d) ∈ S. ∀(S, d) ∈ B : L(S) = L(SL(S¯H ,d), L(S¯
H , d))
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Note, that L(SH , d) ∈ S is obviously always satisfied.
 
x2
x1
S¯H
x
d
S
{x} = Sx
x = N(Sx, x)
= N(S, d)
= N(S¯H, d)
a. Nash:
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(
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R(S, d) = R(Sx, x)
= R(SH, 0)−R(Sx − x, 0)
x = R(SH, d)
b. Raiffa:
R(S, d) = R
(
SR(SH ,d), R(S
H , d)
)
Figure 3:
The structural similarity between RAS* and SHA* that is illustrated in
Figure 3 may at this point appear as a mere curiosity. It is, however, of
considerable importance as it will turn out in the next section that SHA*
(or SHA) substituted for the stronger axiom IIA still suffices to characterize
the Nash solution uniquely among the standard solutions on B.
6 A DETOUR TO THE NASH SOLUTION
The startling “duality” of the axioms SHA and RAS immediately leads to
the question of duality between the bargaining solutions N and R.
Axioms RAS and IIA uniquely determine the solutions R and N , respec-
tively, among the standard bargaining solutions. If SHA which is a strict
weakening of IIA still characterizes N uniquely among the standard solu-
tions then R and N are somehow dual solutions.
THEOREM 2:
There exist a unique standard solution on B that satisfies SHA. This is the
Nash solution N .
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PROOF:
As N is known to satisfy IIA it satisfies in particular SHA on B.
Now consider any standard solution L on B with L 6= N .
As both, L and N , are standard solutions they coincide on BH . Therefore,
there exists at least one game (S, d) ∈ B r BH with L(S, d) 6= N(S, d).
W.l.o.g. we choose d = 0.
Consider a hyperplane game (S¯H , 0) with L(S¯H , 0) ∈ S.
As L is standard we have L(S¯H , 0) = N(S¯H , 0) ∈ S.
By SHA, that holds for N , we conclude that L(S¯H , 0) = N(S¯H , 0) = N(S, 0)
and thus that L(S, 0) 6= L(S¯H , 0). Hence L violates SHA.
Q.E.D.
This result says that the difference between the Nash solution N and the
Sequential Raiffa solution R amounts to the difference between the two
“dual” axioms SHA and RAS as both, R and N, are standard solutions.
Due to a lack of a duality theory for NTU games in the literature, however,
it remains an open problem whether this is really a duality in the usual
mathematical sense.
7 SEQUENTIAL RAIFFA VERSUS NASH:
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Nash and the Sequential Raiffa solution are both determined by the
three standard axioms and some transfer principle that describes how to
proceed from a standard solution on BH to get a unique solution on B.
For the Nash solution this transfer is defined by the axiom SHA that is
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closely related to Shapley’s λ-transfer. Among the hyperplane bargaining
games supporting (from outside) a given game (S, d) ∈ B there is exactly
one whose solution is attainable in (S, d). This results from a Brower type
fixed point argument used by Shapley (1969) together with convexity of
bargaining games. The Nash solution is the unique no trade equal dis-
tribution Walrasian equilibrium of the bargaining game interpreted as an
Arrow-Debreu economy (c.f. Trockel (1996)). For any other supporting hy-
perplane game the Nash solution would not be attainable in (S, d). Rather
transfers (i.e. trade) would be necessary to realize it. A hint to a close rela-
tion between the Nash bargaining solution and the equal division Walrasian
equilibrium via a shared consistency axiom called Multilateral Stability had
already been made by Thomson and Lensberg (1989, p. 101).
The transfer principle for the Sequential Raiffa solution is quite different.
Here it is not a single hyperplane game that provides the solution but a
whole sequence of them. And these do not support (S, d). Rather together
they approach the Sequential Raiffa solution via the sequence of their solu-
tions. The repeated generation of smaller and smaller remaining bargaining
games converging, like the sequence of their disagreement points, to R(S, d)
results from repeated mutual concessions (“trades”) at certain transfer rates
till nothing remains to be exchanged to mutual advantage. This is reminis-
cent of consecutive non-market clearing exchange activities followed by new
exchange at different prices until some kind of non-Walrasian equilibrium is
reached (cf. Benassy (1989)).
Also R(S, d) may be written as a unique fixed point. But this results from
the Banach Fixed point theorem for contractions. In fact, repeated appli-
cation of some contracting map T is generating the sequence (Sdn , d
n) of
bargaining games from (Sd◦, d
◦) := (Sd, d).
While N(S, d) corresponds to a one shot Walrasian equilibrium that may
derived from some tatonnement process, R(S, d) is the result of some non-
tatonnement process.
I believe that working out a rigorous economic approach representing the
Raiffa procedure will also help to clarify the exact meaning of the “duality”
between N and R.
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